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Decision Making in the Environmental Impact Assessment Process 
 
Making a decision is like standing at the proverbial fork in the road.  
One cannot stand still, one cannot take both forks, and one cannot  
be sure in advance which fork will prove to be the right path.  
Frans H. van Eemeren et al. 
 
Introduction 
 This essay analyzes the decision-making processes used by government agencies to 
approve or reject projects that have significant impacts on the environment. One may believe that 
an agency will use a well-defined procedural process for making decisions, but in reality, various 
internal and external factors have greater influences over the decision maker. This essay 
examines some of the real-life inputs into the decision-making process and analyzes the results 
of three agency decisions that affected the environment.  
 To begin with, I will describe some of the basic requirements for decision making as 
provided in the implementing regulations for the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). I 
will also discuss several academic observations about decision making with an emphasis on 
environmental assessments. I present three case studies involving different projects that were 
analyzed by government agencies using the Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) process. For 
each example, I provide an overview of the project and the significant issues as documented in 
the respective EISs. I also describe the agencies’ final decisions and the reasons given for each 
decision. I plan to demonstrate that government agencies tend to elevate social, cultural, and 
political concerns over the natural environment. In addition, I plan to demonstrate that unique 
factors influenced the decision maker in each situation. 
 In the next section, I describe some of the regulatory requirements for environmental 
decision-making. 
Regulatory Requirements 
 In response to the 1960s environmental movement and several high-profile pollution 
incidents, the U.S. Congress passed NEPA in 1969. President Nixon signed NEPA into law on 
January 1, 1970. The Act created new requirements for assessing government-sponsored 
activities that have significant impacts on the environment. According to Diori Kreske (1996), 
the U.S. Congress intended for NEPA to create a balance—a productive harmony—between 
environmental resources and people.  
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 The Act has two main goals. First, agencies have to consider the environmental impacts 
of a proposed action before making a decision. Second, an agency has to inform the public that it 
considered these environmental impacts during its decision-making process. It is important to 
point out that NEPA does not require agencies to elevate environmental concerns over other 
appropriate political, economic, and social considerations. Rather, NEPA only requires agencies 
to take a hard look at the environmental consequences of a proposed action before implementing 
the action. Although Congress designed NEPA to achieve environmentally positive results 
through a compulsory procedural mechanism, NEPA simply prohibits uninformed, not unwise, 
agency decisions (Nowlin & Henry, 2008). 
 On the other hand, scholars note that full disclosure of the environmental impacts can 
have a powerful influence on both the agency and the public (Bazerman et al., 2003). The 
information gained through the EIS process may have the power to impact agency policy, the 
final decision, and/or society itself. If the public does not like the agency’s final decision, it has 
the option of challenging the agency in court or electing influential politicians who support the 
public’s position (Dietz & Stern, 2008). 
 The NEPA process is supposed to improve the quality of decisions that have an effect on 
the environment. In particular, regulation 40 CFR 1500.1(c) states that NEPA’s purpose is not to 
generate paperwork—even excellent paperwork—but to foster excellent action. Attorneys 
Michelle Nowlin and Thomas Henry (2008) note that “NEPA is founded on the premise that, by 
educating Federal decision makers about the environmental consequences of their actions, these 
officials would select more environmentally-positive courses of action” (p. 3). In other words, by 
knowing the consequences of a proposed action, the decision maker is expected to choose the 
most environmentally friendly option. 
  Another impact of NEPA is the infusion of public comments into the decision-making 
process. The passage of NEPA gave everybody a voice in decisions regarding use of public 
funds and public lands (Nowlin & Henry, 2008). The infusion of public input into the decision-
making process is supposed to result in better agency decisions (Dietz & Stern, 2008). The 
Council on Environmental Quality agrees, noting that the best decisions are those that meet the 
needs of the community while minimizing adverse impacts on the environment (McGinty, 1997).  
 In response to the passage of NEPA, government agencies developed procedures for 
assessing the effects of federal actions on the environment. These procedural requirements 
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include instructions for conducting environmental impact assessments and preparing EISs. The 
EIS process is supposed to weigh the benefits versus the costs of the project. In accordance with 
regulation 40 CFR 1502.1, federal officials are supposed to use the information gained during the 
EIS development process, in conjunction with other relevant material, to plan actions and to 
make decisions. Through the EIS process, agencies have to publicly acknowledge the 
environmental consequences of their actions prior to actually taking the proposed action. Later in 
this essay, I describe three sets of EISs that were developed for projects that had significant 
impacts on the environment. 
 Both government agencies and the public have one potential shared misunderstanding 
about the EIS process—whether agencies make decisions beforehand, and then develop EISs to 
justify these decisions. Regulations specifically prohibit government agencies from doing this 
(see 40 CFR 1502.5). However, members of the public recognize that the draft EIS, issued for 
public commenting, will present a proposed recommendation for the decision maker’s 
consideration, a rhetorical maneuver suggesting that the agency may have structured the EIS to 
support the proposed action under consideration. Ben Noller (2009) notes that “there is 
significant public skepticism as to whether federal agencies truly remain objective and candid 
during the NEPA process, especially when the agency is itself a proponent of the particular 
project rather than a permit-issuing arbiter” (p. 7). In other words, agencies that propose their 
own projects may be less objective in the NEPA process than third-party agencies. 
 Finally, in accordance with regulation 40 CFR 1505.2, each agency is required to prepare 
a concise public Record of Decision. The Record of Decision is supposed to state what the 
decision was, identify alternatives considered, and discuss relevant factors (economics, technical 
considerations, and agency mission) used by the agency when making its decision. 
 In the next section, I present several academic studies about decision making, with an 
emphasis on environmental assessments.  
Literature Review 
 Academics have studied the decision-making process, and the results of these studies 
indicate that the decision maker must take into consideration many internal and external factors 
during the decision-making process. For example, Carolyn Rude (1995) studied technical and 
business decision-making. Rude suggests that decision makers must consider three criteria 
(technical, managerial, and social) when making a decision. Technical criteria include legal 
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restrictions, standards, codes, and past precedents. Social criteria include the environmental 
impacts, cultural issues, ethical issues, and human values. Managerial criteria include costs, 
equipment, personnel, training, and demand. Ideally, the agency decision maker will consider all 
three criteria prior to making a decision that affects the environment.  
 Academics also suggest that environmental decision-making is a complex process. For 
instance, Thomas Dietz and Paul Stern (2008) comment that “environmental decisions present 
very complex choices among interests and values, so much that the choices are political, social, 
cultural, and economic, at least as much as they are scientific and technical”  (pp. 7-8). Likewise, 
Robert Bartlett (1997) studied the rationality and logic of NEPA. Bartlett suggests that NEPA 
decisions are based in politics, in part, because NEPA does not mandate particular results. 
Bartlett reinforces this idea by suggesting that NEPA “decisions are expected to be made in 
political ways, by political persons, in political settings” (p. 53). Similarly, Richard Shepard 
(2005) comments that the selection of the proposed action “almost always is based on social 
values, economic priorities, and political considerations” (p. 7). In other words, agency decision 
makers tend to elevate social and political concerns over the environmental costs of a project.  
 The ultimate goal of the environmental assessment process is a decision that is informed 
and defensible. However, this goal is difficult for several reasons due to the multiple objectives 
and pressures of the various stakeholders, the many conflicting constraints between the various 
environmental options, and the accumulation of large amounts of project-specific information 
that the public and decision maker have to consider. As a result, environmental assessment 
decisions fall into the “broad category of multi-objective, multi-criteria decisions” (Shepard, 
2005, p. 4). 
 One may wonder if agency decision makers actually use the information presented in an 
EIS. Various scholars have researched certain projects or specific agencies, and these scholars 
believe that the conclusions of the environmental impact assessment have little influence on the 
decision maker. Instead, the decision maker is influenced by the decision making process.  
 To begin with, Anne Hansen, Lone Kornov, Matthew Cashmore, and Tim Richardson 
(2013) suggest that decision-making is influenced by structures and actors. In particular, 
environmental impact assessment decision making “is not necessarily determined in the final 
approval at the end of the process, but is shaped by input from actors more or less continuously 
during the [assessment] process” (p. 39). In a case study, Hansen et al. concluded that the actors 
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in a working group influenced the decision maker, and the findings presented in the 
environmental impact assessment report had little influence on the final decision. 
 Similarly, Ytsen Deelstra, Sibout Nooteboom, Ralph Kohlmann, Job van den Berg, and 
Sally Innanen (2003) suggest that “the world of decision-making is determined not only by 
formal procedures and governmental bodies, but also consists largely of informal processes 
wherein various actors negotiate with each other” (p. 520). The authors suggest that planned and 
structured environmental research seems of little importance to policy decision makers. Instead, 
the authors believe that “decision-making can be perceived as a game played by negotiating 
actors operating in informal and semi-formal forums” (p. 522). The goal of the game is to 
influence the decision maker. For this reason, the authors suggest that the environmental impact 
assessment report should concentrate on the issues that are important to the involved actors; 
otherwise, the report may not be used for decision making. 
 In addition, Luuc van Breda and Gerard Dijkema (1998) note that environmental 
“decision-making is unstructured, uncontrollable, and unpredictable. Furthermore, the actual 
contents of the [environmental impact assessment] contributed little to decision-making” 
(p. 391). Instead, the authors believe that the process of decision-making influenced the final 
decision more than the content of the environmental impact assessment report.  
 Finally, Marc Stern and Andrew Predmore (2011) studied the results of NEPA decisions 
within the U.S. Forest Service. They noted that NEPA and decision-making were not always 
coupled, but were commonly separated. The authors suggest that decision makers “tended to 
emphasize the importance of efficiency in NEPA processes while deemphasizing the importance 
of minimizing the negative social and environmental consequences of their actions” (p. 272). 
One reason for this mindset is agency accountability. The authors suggest that agency decision 
makers are accountable to produce measurable outcomes dictated by fiscal year targets. As a 
result, decision makers desire to get proposed actions implemented as “cleanly and efficiently as 
possible” (p. 272). For example, the initial preferred alternative presented in an environmental 
assessment was selected about half of the time for complex projects and about three-fourths of 
the time for simple projects. That is, the agency demonstrated efficiency by consistently 
selecting the original proposed alternative. 
 In the following section, I present three examples of environmental decision-making, and 
I explain the major influences on the decision maker. Later in this essay, I will explain whether 
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these three examples are in compliance with NEPA requirements and whether they are 
representative of the academics’ conclusions. 
Three Examples of Environmental Decision-Making 
U.S. Department of the Army, Makua Military Reservation 
 The first example involves the U.S. Army’s decision to conduct live-fire training at the 
Makua Military Reservation. The Makua Valley is located on the western side of the Hawaiian 
island of Oahu. Perched between the Pacific Ocean and the volcanic bluffs of the Waianae 
Mountains, the valley is home to endangered plant and animal species as well as numerous 
archaeological ruins. The name Makua means “parent” in the Hawaiian language, and some 
claim that the Makua Valley is the mythic birthplace of the Hawaiian people (Myers, 2001). The 
Makua Valley is also home to the U.S. Army’s Makua Military Reservation (Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1: Makua Military Reservation, Island of Oahu 
  The Makua Military Reservation has a long and storied history that dates back to the 
1920s, when the military first installed gun emplacements in the valley. After the attack on Pearl 
Harbor, the Army confiscated around 6,600 acres and evicted ranchers from the valley in order 
to train troops for World War II. The Army still controls around 4,200 acres of the valley. 
 For many years, the Army and other military services bombed, strafed, and shot bullets 
within the Makua Valley “with relative impunity” (Myers, 2001, p. 2). In 1998, live-fire training 
caused wildfires in the valley, catching the attention of the local residents as well as the U.S. Fish 
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and Wildlife Service. Because of these wildfires, the Army suspended training activities at the 
Makua Military Reservation. 
  A group of residents and the advocacy group Earthjustice Legal Defense Fund filed a 
lawsuit against the Army in response to the wildfires. The plaintiffs demanded that the Army 
comply with the requirements of NEPA and conduct a thorough review of the environmental 
impacts of training on the Makua Valley. Local activists also believed that the Army did not 
fully understand and respect the sacredness of the Makua Valley (Myers, 2001). 
 The Army subsequently completed a limited environmental impact assessment in 2000 
and then announced that it would resume partial training activities. The Army’s analysis 
concluded that it could conduct live-fire training without damaging historic sites and the 
environment. The residents and activists were not impressed with the assessment and took the 
Army to court again in 2001 to block the Army from using the property pending completion of 
an EIS. The activists believed that implementation of the EIS process would ensure that the 
Army conducted a thorough review of the environmental impacts of military training. 
 The Army initially balked at the idea because of the time and money that would be 
necessary to complete the EIS process, and the Army tried to have the lawsuit dismissed.  The 
local activists prevailed in court, and the Army had to refrain from using the Makua Valley for 
live-fire operations pending completion of the EIS process.  
 The Army subsequently issued the draft EIS (U.S. Department of the Army, 2005) in 
August 2005 and the final EIS (U.S. Department of the Army, 2009a) in July 2009. The 
proposed action, and the various alternatives to the proposed action, involved different levels of 
training. In other words, the Army intended to conduct training at the Makua Military 
Reservation, and the decision maker was expected to choose the level of training that would be 
conducted. The final EIS, with all attachments, consisted of about 6,000 pages of text. 
 The primary inputs into the decision-making process included training range capacity, 
range design (size, location), quality of life of the soldier, and time and cost considerations. The 
Army’s goal was to provide the training needed to keep soldiers ready for battle.  The Army 
developed selection criteria that only the Makua Military Reservation would meet; therefore, the 
EIS process purposely limited the options of the decision maker. In fact, the Army authors 
included a no-action alternative that would have allowed low levels of training to continue in the 
Makua Valley. 
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Figure 2: Meteorological monitoring at Makua Military Reservation 
 During its environmental impact assessment (Figure 2), the Army identified over 100 
different cultural sites on the 4,200-acre property including temples, alters, burial sites, and 
petroglyphs. The Army also determined that the valley was home to about 50 occurring or 
potentially occurring endangered plant and animal species. Army officials were forced to 
acknowledge, through the EIS process, that live-fire training would cause some environmental 
and cultural damage to the Makua Valley.  
 The Army issued its Record of Decision (U.S. Department of the Army, 2009b) in July 
2009. The decision maker clearly stated that training was required to comply with the Army’s 
mission and procedural requirements. The Record of Decision also states that training would 
have significant natural environment and social effects. The Army chose to implement a hybrid 
alternative in lieu of the preferred alternative; that is, live fire training would still be conducted 
but with restrictions to minimize environmental harm.   
 Another lawsuit ensued, and the activists won a partial court victory in November 2009. 
The activists successfully argued that the Army had incompletely documented the cultural and 
marine assessments in the EIS. The Army unsuccessfully counter-argued that the long-term 
suspension of training was causing a slow degradation in troop readiness. Currently, under court 
order, the Army is studying the impacts of military training on marine resources at the Makua 
Beach. 
 In summary, the Makua Military Reservation EIS was an environmental assessment of 
the impacts of live-fire training within a sacred valley on the Island of Oahu. The Army had to 
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decide how much training would be conducted in the valley, despite the potential damage to 
wildlife, habitats, and cultural resources. During the EIS process, the Army emphasized its 
statutory mission and concluded that it must conduct military training in the Makua Valley to 
fulfill its mission. Although the mission of an agency is one of several relevant factors in the 
decision-making process, the Army focused its rhetorical efforts on this factor. These rhetorical 
efforts were not entirely successful with the local population who did not support the Army’s 
mission.  
 The Army was the primary beneficiary of its decision. Others who supported the decision 
included those who stood to financially benefit from training activities, including local 
businesses. Those who championed the natural environment and local culture, including activists 
and some Hawaiians, did not agree with the Army’s decision. The Army did not voluntarily 
implement the EIS process. Instead, the Army implemented the EIS process in response to 
lawsuits initiated by the opposition. 
U.S. Forest Service, Rinconada Communication Site 
 The second example involves the construction of a communication tower on Mt. Taylor, 
New Mexico. Mt. Taylor was named after former President Zachary Taylor. The mountain is a 
dormant volcano located northeast of Grants, New Mexico. At 11,305 feet, it’s the tallest 
mountain in the San Mateo mountain range.  
 The area around Mt. Taylor is home to a number of Native American tribes, most notably 
the Navajo Nation. To the Navajo, Mt. Taylor is known as Tsoodził, one of four sacred 
mountains. The four sacred mountains are the geographic boundary points for the Navajos’ 
ancestral homeland. According to American Indian scholar Sharon Milholland (2010), the sacred 
mountains “are imbued with…deep personal spiritual meaning transcending the physical and the 
metaphysical” (p. 110). Similarly, Tony Joe, a member of the Navajo Nation Historic 
Preservation Department, comments that: 
Mt. Taylor plays a vital role in all major Navajo ceremonies, sandpaintings, and 
prayers….And it is the responsibility of the Navajo people to give offerings, prayers, and 
ceremonies to the mountain. The mountain in returns [sic] provides the people with 
protection, and direction so we can continue to thrive as a Nation. (U.S. Department of 
Agriculture, 2011a, p. 45) 
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Figure 3: Mt. Taylor, New Mexico  
(www.fs.usda.gov/cibola) 
 Mt. Taylor (Figure 3) is situated within the Cibola National Forest. In August 2006, KD 
Radio, Inc. applied for a communication use lease with the U.S. Forest Service to construct a 
new high-power FM broadcast facility on Mt. Taylor. KD Radio wanted to install the tower and 
associated support equipment on the mountain to widen its listening range. The location of the 
proposed tower was the Rinconada Communication Site. The Spanish-based word rinconada 
means “dead end” or “secluded place,” suggesting that the site would be situated at a secluded 
location on Mt. Taylor. As lead agency, the Cibola National Forest had the responsibility to 
conduct an environmental impact assessment of the construction and operation of the 
communication tower. 
 The benefits of the tower were significant. Besides providing the public with oldies music 
and local news, the station could provide emergency response broadcasts, especially during 
hazardous weather conditions. Supporters of the project included the Governor’s office, local 
school district, and local law enforcement agencies. However, the local tribes objected to the 
radio tower because it would be constructed on Tsoodził, one of four sacred mountains.  
 The battle lines were drawn—technology and progress (and oldies music) on one side 
and the traditions of the local tribes on the other. The Cibola National Forest was the government 
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agency responsible for being the arbitrator in this battle. The Forest Supervisor had final say in 
the matter, unless someone filed an appeal. 
 The Cibola National Forest conducted a formal review of the environmental and social 
impacts of the tower. The draft EIS (U.S. Department of Agriculture, 2009) was issued for public 
comment in May 2009. The Forest Service concluded that the tower would have significant 
impacts on cultural resources; however, there were no natural environmental impacts. Following 
its review of public comments, the agency issued the final EIS (U.S. Department of Agriculture, 
2011a) in January 2011. The agency published its Record of Decision (U.S. Department of 
Agriculture, 2011b) in April 2011. The Forest Supervisor ruled in favor of tradition by rejecting 
KD Radio’s application.  
 
Figure 4: Mt. Taylor in the fall  
(www.fs.usda.gov/cibola) 
Interestingly, the Forest Service reversed its preferred alternatives between EIS revisions. 
In the draft EIS, the Forest Service supported the tower, but in the final EIS, the agency 
supported the no-action alternative. The agency changed its mind based on external pressure 
from the Navajo and internal agency pressure to preserve Mt. Taylor as a traditional cultural 
property. 
 KD Radio filed an appeal in June 2011. The decision was upheld a month later by the 
Forest Service (Krueger, 2011). The agency ruled that the EIS process was conducted in 
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accordance with Forest Service procedures; therefore, it was a valid and defensible decision. 
However, based on the wording of the final decision, the door was left open for KD Radio, or 
some other company, to reapply—if the applicant could successfully reach out and obtain the 
support of the local tribes. 
 In summary, the agency’s analysis concluded that the construction and operation of the 
tower would have resulted in little to no impact on the natural environment. Instead, the agency 
concentrated its rhetorical efforts on the cultural impacts of the tower. The Forest Service 
eventually denied the application due to these cultural impacts. In my opinion, the agency 
downplayed the beneficial social and economic impacts of expanded radio service during the EIS 
process. The Forest Service also appears to have rejected the application primarily to appease the 
Navajos. The Navajo benefitted from the decision, while the applicant and those who would have 
gained from improved radio service did not benefit. 
 What is remarkable about this decision is that it deviates from the norm. Nancy Coppola 
(2000) suggests that, “for mainstream America, the dominant ideology is progress-oriented, 
economic, and technologically situated" (p. 23). The final EIS for the Rinconada Communication 
Site, and the agency decision, took the opposite approach. That is, the agency chose tradition 
over technological advancement.  
Bureau of Indian Affairs, Absaloka Mine Expansion 
 The third example involves the Bureau of Indian Affairs’ (BIA) review and approval of 
the expansion of the Absaloka coal mine by Westmoreland Resources, Inc. (WRI). 
Westmoreland Resources obtained its first lease from the Crow Tribe in 1972. This lease 
included the rights to coal reserves situated in the 1.1-million acre Crow Ceded Area located 
north of the Crow Indian Reservation in Big Horn County, Montana.  
 The Absaloka Mine opened in 1974. Through 2006, about 147 million tons of coal had 
been produced at the mine (U.S. Department of the Interior, 2008a). In February 2004, WRI 
entered into a new lease agreement with the Crow Tribe, under the provisions of the Indian 
Mineral Leasing Act, for two undeveloped and interconnected coal reserves encompassing 3,660 
acres. The two leases were called the Tract III lease and the South Extension lease. The Tract III 
lease is located between the existing mine in the Crow Ceded Area and the Crow Indian 
Reservation, and the South Extension lease is located wholly within the reservation. Western 
 Decision Making in the Environmental Impact Assessment Process 13 
 
Resources exercised its lease options for these two properties in June 2006 because it was 
running out of coal in the Crow Ceded Area (Figure 5).  
 
Figure 5: Absaloka Mine  
(U.S. Department of Interior, draft EIS, 2008a) 
 Before WRI could begin strip-mining operations within the two new properties, it needed 
to obtain a number of government approvals and permits. One hurdle was an environmental 
impact assessment of the proposed activity. In November 2006, the BIA published a Notice of 
Intent in the Federal Register (71 FR 68831) notifying the public that the agency planned to 
prepare an EIS for the two proposed extensions of the Absaloka Mine. In the Federal Register 
Notice, the BIA notified the public that the proposed action was to approve the mineral leases 
and associated surface use agreements. That is, the BIA planned to give WRI the necessary 
approvals to conduct strip-mining operations on the two properties. 
  With the help of a contractor, the BIA issued the draft EIS in March 2008 (U.S. 
Department of the Interior, 2008a). Similar to the wording of the 2006 Notice of Intent, the 
agency’s proposed action was to approve the two extensions of the permit area to allow WRI to 
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strip-mine coal on the two properties. The draft EIS concluded that strip-mining operations 
would have positive effects on the Crow’s socioeconomics but negative effects on air quality, 
groundwater quality, surface water quality, and wildlife habitats (Figure 6).  
 
Figure 6: Typical landscape in South Extension area of Crow Indian Reservation 
(U.S. Department of the Interior, Record of Decision, 2008c) 
 The BIA simultaneously issued the final EIS (U.S. Department of the Interior, 2008b) 
and Record of Decision (U.S. Department of the Interior, 2008c) in October 2008. The final EIS 
recommended approval of the proposed action, and the Record of Decision formally approved 
the proposed action. The decision was finalized in November 2008, after the expiration of the 
regulatory-required 30-day waiting period.  
 In 2009, after receipt of all remaining government approvals and permits, WRI began 
mining operations in the expanded areas. These expanded areas contains an estimated 77 million 
tons of coal. According to the executive vice president for WRI, “the Absaloka mine is 
somewhat unique in that it's one of the very few mines mining Native American coal” 
(Bushbaum, 2011, p. 49). This partnership “has produced a significant amount of revenue for the 
Tribe” (Bushbaum, 2011, p. 49) through royalty payments, taxes, and employment opportunities.  
 In summary, the BIA conducted an assessment of the impacts of coal mining on the Crow 
Indian Reservation in Montana. The BIA focused its attention on the short-term socioeconomic 
benefits—efficient mining operations, use of coal for power production, and income to the Crow 
Indians—over all other factors. Despite the environmental damage that mining would cause, the 
Crow supported these strip-mining operations because of the short-term financial benefits they 
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would receive. In my opinion, the BIA downplayed the negative effects of coal mining and coal 
burning during the environmental assessment process. There are indications that the BIA 
intended to approve the project prior to development of the draft EIS, and the agency appeared to 
implement the EIS process simply to comply with NEPA requirements. 
 After completion of the EIS process, the Crow discovered that mining operations had 
destroyed one of their cherished cultural sites—a bison kill site. The Crow tribe was critical of 
the mine operator and the BIA after it became aware of the loss. This incident initiated a public 
debate as to whether the BIA conducted a sufficient cultural resource inventory during the EIS 
process. In my opinion, the BIA didn’t provide sufficient information to the public about the 
cultural resources that would be impacted during mining. Instead, the BIA apparently expected 
the public to obtain this information outside of the EIS process. 
 In recent years, the coal industry has experienced a significant downturn, and the 
downturn has dramatically affected the Absaloka Mine. The mine’s annual output has decreased 
in recent years, due to decreased domestic demand for coal, and the economic benefits to the 
Crow have declined accordingly. The mine operator hopes that international demand for coal 
will increase; otherwise, the future looks bleak for the Absaloka coal mine. 
Discussion 
 Recall that NEPA has two main goals—that an agency has to consider the environmental 
impacts of a proposed project and that the agency has to inform the public about these impacts. 
All three agencies—Army, Forest Service, and BIA—implemented the requirements of NEPA 
by conducting the required analyses although the Army conducted its analysis under court order. 
All three agencies informed the public of their respective conclusions via draft EISs, final EISs, 
and Records of Decision.  
 The Army chose to conduct live-fire training in the Makua Valley due to political 
considerations, the Forest Service chose the no-action alternative due to cultural concerns, and 
the BIA approved strip-mining operations due to economic and mining efficiency priorities. All 
three agencies concluded that the economic and social aspects of the human environment 
outweighed the natural environment. That is, each agency chose a course of action based on 
social, cultural, or political impacts of the project versus the natural or physical environmental 
impacts. This finding is in agreement with the opinions of Dietz and Stern (2008) as well as 
Bartlett (1997) who point out that NEPA does not require agencies to elevate environmental 
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concerns over other appropriate political, economic, and social considerations. Daniel Bronstein, 
Dinah Baer, Hobson Bryan, Joseph DiMento, and Sanjay Narayan (2005) remind us that “the 
underlying principle of NEPA is that all impacts of a project are eventually social, as they 
ultimately affect people” (p. 675).  
 During my review of the three sets of EIS documents, I noted that the agency authors 
concentrated on a particular angle or point of view. The Army concentrated its rhetorical efforts 
on fulfilling its mission. Timothy Brady (1990) points out that the temptation is great for the 
agency seeking to perform some action to write an EIS to allow itself to achieve its statutory 
mission. Since the Army rhetorically structured the EIS to support its position, one could argue 
that this was analogous to the Army being a biased proponent of the project.  
 Lisa Berzok (1986) discusses several mistakes that agencies make during the 
environmental assessment process. One mistake is that agencies incorrectly design and define the 
projects prior to the environmental impact assessment. For example, many agencies “define their 
objectives so narrowly that only a similarly narrow project definition can meet them” (Berzok, 
1986, p. 121). I suggest that the Army fell into this trap when it established criteria so narrow 
that only the Makua Military Reservation met the project objectives. Not surprisingly, the Army 
chose to use the Makua Military Reservation for training based on the criteria that it had 
established.  
 The Forest Service was a third-party arbitrator, and the agency concentrated its rhetorical 
efforts on the cultural drawbacks of the project. I believe that the Rinconada Communication Site 
EIS decision could have gone either way. There was no clear evidence that the agency was a 
proponent or opponent of the project, although the Navajo’s opinions weighed heavily on the 
final decision of the agency. 
  The BIA concentrated its rhetorical efforts on the short-term benefits over the costs to 
society and the environment. Because the BIA appeared ready to approve the mine expansion 
from the beginning, I wondered whether the BIA used the EIS process to justify its decision. 
Regulation 40 CFR 1502.5 prohibits government agencies from using the EIS process to justify 
decisions already made. After my review of this EIS process, I decided that the BIA was 
demonstrating a paternalistic attitude towards the Crow, instead of being a proponent of the strip-
mining project itself. The Indian Mineral leasing Act of 1938 stipulates that the U.S. government 
must approve all mineral leases, and the BIA is the agency responsible for the federal 
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government-Indian trust relationships. Because of this paternalistic attitude, I suspect that the 
BIA would have approved any project that benefitted the Crow. 
 Earlier in this essay, Rude (1995) suggested that decision makers must consider three 
criteria (technical, managerial, and social) when making a decision. The Army appeared to 
concentrate on technical and managerial criteria when it emphasized its statutory mission, 
procedural requirements, training requirements, and costs. The Army appears to have initially 
downplayed the social criteria, much to the chagrin of the local public. The Forest Service and 
BIA both appear to concentrate on the social criteria at the expense of the technical and 
managerial criteria.  
 As discussed earlier, academics (Deelstra et al., (2003); Hansen et al., 2013; van Breda & 
Dijkema, 1998) suggest that decision making is influenced by the decision-making process and 
by actors who negotiate with each other. Of my three examples, only the Forest Service’s final 
decision appears to have been influenced by external actors. The Forest Service changed its mind 
about the communication tower, from acceptance to rejection, based on its negotiations with the 
Navajo. The Army decision maker appeared determined to approve the project regardless of 
external influence. The influences on the Army appear to have originated entirely within the 
agency. The decision maker’s selection of a hybrid of the proposed alternative appears to be a 
compromise to the outside stakeholders; although, one could argue that this compromise was still 
in the Army’s favor. Finally, the BIA also appeared determined to approve the expansion of the 
coal mine, in part, because there was no real opposition to the project, prior to tribal discovery 
that mining operations had destroyed a sensitive bison kill site. 
 Stern and Predmore (2011) suggested that agency decision makers are influenced by 
efficiency and accountability. All three decision makers demonstrated some level of focus on 
agency goals. To begin with, the Army was focused on meeting its mission and internal 
procedures. However, the Army’s EIS process was not efficient due to various external factors. 
First, the Army spent years creating a 6,000-page EIS document that was not rhetorically 
effective with the local public. Further, the Army was forced, multiple times, to implement the 
NEPA process by local courts. The Army might have been more successful if it had effectively 
reached out to the public during the original scoping process.   
 The Forest Service appeared to demonstrate efficiency and accountability when it denied 
the appeal. In its denial, the agency focused on its compliance with internal procedures (Krueger, 
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2011) claiming that the original decision—denial of the permit for the tower—was appropriate. 
According to the Forest Service, the denial was appropriate because the EIS process was 
conducted in accordance with agency procedures.  
 Finally, the BIA completed the EIS process as expeditiously as possible. The agency 
notified the public that it planned to implement the EIS process in November 2006. The agency 
issued the draft EIS for public comment in March 2008, and the agency issued the final EIS and 
Record of Decision in October 2008. Ben Noller (2009) notes that “since the inception of NEPA, 
the timeline for implementing [the NEPA process] has increased from just over two years to 
something in excess of five years” (p. 20). The BIA completed the Absaloka Mine Expansion 
EIS process within two years, suggesting that the BIA was motivated to complete the project in a 
timely manner. 
 In a different matter, the Army appears to have been unsuccessful in its implementation 
of the EIS process. To begin with, the Army spend considerable resources to create a 6,000-page 
EIS that was unconvincing to the local public, primarily because the Army didn’t really address 
the concerns of the audience. Earlier in this essay, Deelstra et al. (2003) suggested that the 
environmental impact assessment report should concentrate on the issues that are important to 
the involved actors; otherwise, the report may not be used for decision making. Initially, the 
Army did not concentrate on the issues that were important to the locals, and as a result, the 
Army had to spend more time and resources upgrading the EIS product. Further, I question 
whether anyone, including the deciding official, actually read the entire 6,000-page final EIS.  
 I suggest that the Army incorrectly assessed the external social and political influences 
and failed to incorporate these influences until later into the EIS process. As Carolyn Rude 
(1995) notes that “social and political factors, which are hard to measure or prove, can 
nevertheless affect the success of the decision" (p. 190). The Army’s failure to consider the 
social and political factors early in the process resulted in considerable losses of time and money. 
In addition, the Army appeared committed to using the Makua Valley for live live-fire training 
from the beginning. As Rude (1995) points out, “a commitment to a position discourages a 
change" (p. 185). The Army was committed to using Makua Military Reservation for live-fire 
testing, and its commitment to this position resulted in considerable costs and years of legal 
battles. 
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Conclusions 
 This essay analyzed the results of three decision-making processes used by government 
agencies to approve or reject projects that have significant impacts on the environment. I tried to 
determine how these decisions fit into NEPA requirements. The purpose of NEPA, as provided 
in regulation 40 CFR 1500.1(c), is to promote better decisions: 
Ultimately, of course, it is not better documents but better decisions that count. NEPA’s 
purpose is not to generate paperwork—even excellent paperwork—but to foster excellent 
action. The NEPA process is intended to help public officials make decisions that are 
based on understanding of environmental consequences, and take actions that protect, 
restore, and enhance the environment. 
 However, in all three case studies (Army, Forest Service, and BIA), the agencies elevated 
social, cultural, and political considerations over environmental concerns. Both the Army and the 
BIA made decisions that didn’t necessarily protect, restore, and enhance the environment. 
Academics (Bartlett, 1997; Dietz & Stern, 2008; Shepard, 2005) have previously suggested that 
government agencies would elevate human concerns over environmental concerns. Bronstein 
et al. (2005) agree, pointing out that “the underlying principle of NEPA is that all impacts of a 
project are eventually social, as they ultimately affect people” (p. 675). I suggest that many 
decision makers will probably decide that a project’s social, cultural, and political impacts are 
more important than the environmental impacts. The U.S. Congress intended for NEPA to create 
a balance—a productive harmony—between environmental resources and people (Kreske, 
1996). I question whether today’s decision-making processes are representative of this balance, 
as intended by Congress, or whether Bartlett (1997) is correct—all environmental decisions are 
political in nature.  
 I considered the role of the EIS in environmental decision-making. According to 
regulation 40 CFR 1502.1, an EIS is more than a disclosure document. Further, the EIS shall be 
used by federal officials in conjunction with other relevant material to plan actions and make 
decisions. Some academics (Deelstra et al., 2003; Hansen et al., 2013; van Breda & Dijkema, 
1998) suggest that the EIS process, not the EIS conclusion, influences the decision maker. Of my 
three case studies, only one decision (the Forest Service) appears to have been influenced by the 
process. The Army appears to have been influenced by internal pressures, while the BIA didn’t 
experience any real internal or external pressures.  
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 I would like to close this essay with the advice of Joseph Arvai (2003). Arvai provides 
several recommendations for an effective decision-making process. This process should include 
a well-defined problem, the incorporation of values and objectives, and informed trade-offs 
between the various positions. Arvai suggests that “people may be more likely to accept 
decisions resulting from processes that seem fair, reasonable, and amenable to allowing all 
interested parties an opportunity to voice their feelings and concerns” (p. 286). This “suggests 
that it is not necessarily the results of participatory decision-making process that are important to 
people...rather, the process employed in attaining the decisions may be equally, if not more, 
important” (Arvai, 2003, p. 288). In other words, members of the public who participate in the 
decision-making process may be able to support the resulting policy decision, even if that 
decision does not result in the outcome that the public wanted. Perhaps the Army could have 
saved itself a lot of time and trouble if it had allowed the public to become more involved at an 
earlier time in the decision-making process? 
Future Research Opportunities  
 During my research of environmental decision-making, I identified a number of academic 
articles discussing the growing use of formal analytical tools and methodologies for systematic 
decision-making. For example, Ivy Huang, Jeffrey Keisler, and Igor Linkov (2011) describe a 
tool called multi-criteria decision analysis (MCDA), a formal methodology that can be used to 
compare alternative courses of action.  
 According to Huang et al. (2011), one commonly used MCDA is analytic hierarchy 
processes/analytic network processes (AHP/ANP). This tool compares paired criteria, asking 
which is more important, to produce weighted scores. Using the AHP/ANP process, it is possible 
that each alternative in an EIS could be assigned a numerical score. The alternative with the 
highest score could be considered the best alternative for selection; although, the score of each 
alternative could be manipulated by how the problem is structured and weights assigned. 
 None of the agencies discussed in this essay (Army, Forest Service, and BIA) used 
analytical tools or methodologies for their systematic decision-making. As noted earlier, many 
academics suggest that the process of decision making appears to have more impact over the 
decision maker than the results of an environmental assessment. Perhaps agencies can use these 
types of tools to promote decisions that are based on the recommendations provided in an 
environmental assessment report.  
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